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The dissent employed the "independent utility" test from a 2000
Ninth Circuit case. This benchmark test, the dissent argued, decides
whether each of the two projects would take place with or without the
other, and thus has independent utility. Here, because the South Project is an expansion of the existing Leeville mine, and split mine operations occurred between the two facilities, the two projects are interconnected and the appropriate evaluation of the two is a single EIS.
Therefore, the dissent would have reversed the district court's granting
of summary judgment as to the sufficiency of the EIS, but affirms in all
other respects.
Brandon Saxon
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(holding that the revocation of Colvin's grazing lease by the government did not affect a taking of its water or other property rights because Colvin did not own a vested grazing right in the federal land).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed a ruling by the United States Court of Federal Claims which
dismissed the claims on all counts presented by the Colvin Cattle
Company ("Colvin") against the United States. Colvin held 520 acres
of land adjacent to a 625,000 acre federal parcel called the Montezuma
Allotment. The United States received the allotment by treaty in 1848
and owned it continuously from that time. In 1934, Congress enacted
the Taylor Grazing Act ("TGA") which governs administration of the
land by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). Under the TGA,
Colvin applied for and received a grazing license which was subject to
an annual fee of $966.00. For over twenty years, Colvin paid the fee;
but in February 1995, Colvin failed to do so. Ultimately, the BLM cancelled the grazing lease, assessed trespass damages, and issued a notice
of intent to remove Colvin's cattle. The actions culminated in November 2003 when the BLM issued a final decision to deny Colvin's range
improvement permits and to remove all constructed range improvements-except those necessary for Colvin to exercise its water rights
vested under Nevada law. Colvin's stockwatering rights in the federal
land were not in dispute.
On August 18, 2003, Colvin filed suit in the United States Court of
Federal Claims asserting takings claims on numerous theories, a
breach of contract claim for cancellation of the grazing lease, and a
compensation claim for improvements made by Colvin on the federal
land. The trial court dismissed all claims in favor of the government
and Colvin appealed.
The Court of Federal Claims first considered Colvin's takings
claims under each of its various theories. As an initial matter, the court
noted that a taking cannot occur unless the aggrieved party held a

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

vested property interest in the first instance. Colvin's first theory asserted that the government's revocation of Colvin's grazing lease affected a taking of its vested water rights. Colvin argued that the grazing right was "inherent," or appurtenant, to its water right. Initially,
then, the court considered whether any such "grazing right" had vested
in Colvin. The court noted that as the TGA explicitly denied conveying rights in federal land, any property interest must have vested prior
to 1934. However, prior to that time the Property Clause of the United
States Constitution governed the Allotment and, according to case law,
allowed grazing at the sufferance of the government. Further, the government could retract the grazing right at any time. Therefore, any
"implied license" in grazing prior to 1934 did not convey any vested
rights in the land appurtenant to the water rights obtained by Colvin
or its predecessors. Alternately, Colvin argued that the Nevada Stockwatering Act of 1925 conveyed grazing rights inherent to its vested water rights. The court found no indication in the language of that Act,
or in prior case law, which indicated the Act intended anything other
than to assert police powers over the water rights vested under Nevada
law. It followed that because Colvin had no vested rights in grazing
inherent to its water rights, no takings of the water right occurred
when the government revoked Colvin's grazing license. This finding
also defeated Colvin's claims that the government affected a taking by
rendering its water rights, or the ranch itself, valueless as a result of the
grazing revocation.
The court quickly rejected Colvin's final takings argument which
alleged that the government's failure to prevent its successor to the
grazing license and wild horse from infringing Colvin's water rights
affected a taking. The court noted that the government could not be
held responsible for the infringing acts of private parties or of animals
outside of its control. Finally, Colvin's breach of contract claim was
barred by a six-year statute of limitations and the claim for compensation was not ripe for review because Colvin had not exhausted administrative remedies on that issue.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the ruling of
the Court of Federal Claims, holding that Colvin did not have a vested
property interest in grazing and, as a result, revocation of its grazing
lease did not affect a taking of either its water rights or of its property
interests in adjacent land.
Kathleen Ott
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
United States v. Donovan, 466 F. Supp. 2d 590 (D. Del. 2006)
(holding that the United States Army Corps of Engineers had jurisdiction to regulate all navigable waterways of the United States under the

